Manipulation of contact network structure and the impact on foot-and-mouth disease transmission by Mohr, Sibylle et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Preventive Veterinary Medicine
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/prevetmed
Manipulation of contact network structure and the impact on foot-and-
mouth disease transmission
Sibylle Mohra, Michael Deasona, Mikhail Churakovb,c,d, Thomas Dohertya, Rowland R. Kaoa,⁎
a Boyd Orr Centre for Population and Ecosystem Health, Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health and Comparative Medicine, College of Medical, Veterinary and Life
Sciences, University of Glasgow, Bearsden Road, Glasgow, G61 1QH, UK
bMathematical Modelling of Infectious Diseases Unit, Institut Pasteur, Paris, 75015, France
c CNRS, URA3012, Paris, 75015, France
d Center of Bioinformatics, Biostatistics and Integrative Biology, Institut Pasteur, Paris, 75015, France
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Livestock movements
Disease control
FMD
Network analysis
A B S T R A C T
The movements of livestock between premises and markets can be characterised as a dynamic network where
the structure of the network itself can critically impact the transmission dynamics of many infectious diseases. As
evidenced by the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in the UK, this can involve transmission over
large geographical distances and can result in major economic loss. One consequence of the FMD epidemic was
the introduction of mandatory livestock movement restrictions: a 13-day standstill in Scotland for cattle and
sheep after moving livestock onto a farm (allowing many exemptions) and a 6-day standstill for cattle and sheep
in England and Wales (with minor exemptions, e.g. direct movements to slaughter). Such standstills are known
to be eﬀective but commercial considerations result in pressures to relax them. When contemplating legislative
changes such as a change in length of movement restrictions we need to consider the consequent eﬀect these
could have on the emergent properties of the system, i.e. the network structure itself. In this study, we in-
vestigate how disease dynamics change when the local contact structure of the recorded livestock movement
network in Scotland is altered through rewiring movements between premises. The network rewiring used here
changes the structure of the recorded trade network through a combination of altered movement restrictions and
redirection of movements between holdings and markets to avoid nonsensical activity (e.g. movements to
markets on days when they are inactive) while conserving other characteristics (e.g. movement date as closely as
possible and market sales of the correct animal production type). Rewiring results in networks with higher
clustering coeﬃcients and lower network density. The impact of rewiring on a hypothetical foot-and-mouth
disease outbreak in Scotland was assessed by stochastic simulation, considering scenarios with and without
exemptions to the standstill rules. As expected, rewiring leads to a decrease in outbreak size and - if standstill
exemptions are prohibited – higher probability of smaller outbreaks. Without exemptions, a shorter movement
standstill is almost as eﬀective as a longer standstill period, indicating that a simpler biosecurity system would
oﬀer minimal additional risk for FMD. These results suggest that explicitly manipulating the contact network
structure in a sensible way has the potential to signiﬁcantly impact disease control.
1. Introduction
The movement of livestock between premises is known to play a
critical role in the introduction and dissemination of infectious diseases
among animal holdings. As evidenced by the 2001 foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD) epidemic in Great Britain (GB), this can result in major
economic loss (Haydon et al., 2004) and involve transmission over large
geographical distances (Gibbens et al., 2001; Keeling et al., 2001). At
the epidemic outset, FMD was predominantly disseminated by the rapid
movement of sheep from Longtown market across the whole of GB.
Following the end of the outbreak, mandatory livestock movement re-
strictions were introduced as a biosecurity measure (a 13-day standstill
in Scotland for cattle and sheep after moving livestock onto an agri-
cultural holding but with multiple exemptions1 and a 6-day standstill
cattle and sheep in England and Wales from 2003 with few exemptions)
and the recording of livestock movements through livestock tracing
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systems became a legal requirement (Bourn, 2003; Vernon, 2011). The
length of the respective movement regulations were chosen so as to be
long enough for clinical signs of FMD to develop in infected animals,
but minimises impact on livestock trading as market activities in GB
often have a weekly tempo. Movement records can be used to accu-
rately represent the dynamic connections between livestock holdings
and markets, and they have become invaluable for identifying patterns
critical to understanding the spread of any potential disease (Enright
and Kao, 2016). An intuitive way of describing the structure of these
contacts is as a network, where nodes represent premises and links be-
tween them are livestock movements (Dubé et al., 2009; Keeling and
Eames, 2005; Martínez-López et al., 2009; Ortiz-Pelaez et al., 2006).
Substantial heterogeneity has been observed in many livestock move-
ment networks, often with a few individuals responsible for a dis-
proportionately large number of contacts (Keeling and Eames, 2005;
Shirley and Rushton, 2005). Thus targeting these highly connected in-
dividuals has the potential to be a highly eﬃcient and eﬀective way to
control disease within the population (Christley et al., 2005; Kiss et al.,
2006; Rautureau et al., 2012). However, targeting interventions at in-
dividuals who are selected on the basis of some network property, can
also lead to network alteration where the structure of the network is
explicitly changed and indeed network alteration is itself a potential
disease control strategy. Here, we consider the potential impact of
network rewiring (switching the destination(s) of edges) on FMD out-
break characteristics. First, we present a descriptive analysis of histor-
ical sheep and cattle movements taking place in Scotland within the 13-
day standstill period for the years 2011 to 2013 to assess how move-
ment regulations have inﬂuenced farmer behaviour, including the level
of compliance with movement standstills. Then we outline our ap-
proach to using network analysis and adaptive network rewiring for
epidemic control. We compare rewired networks to the recorded live-
stock movement network via standard static network measures such as
average path length, density, and node-speciﬁc centrality measures.
Finally, we summarise FMD simulations results on both the original
record and on rewired dynamic networks, discuss their implications,
and consider future research directions.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Analysis of standstill compliance
Individual cattle and batched sheep movements between Scottish
holdings from 01/01/2011 to 31/12/2013 were obtained from the
cattle tracing system (CTS) and the Scottish Animal Movement System
(SAMS). These datasets were pre-processed separately and subsequently
combined for analysis. Under standstill regulations, movements from
animal holdings direct to slaughter or to slaughter via a market are
exempt from the 13-day standstill rule and were excluded from further
analysis. Markets and slaughterhouses were identiﬁed through a list of
sheep markets and slaughterhouses obtained from historical sheep
movement data provided by the Scottish Animal Movement Unit
(SAMU). Using the unique county-parish-holding (CPH) number as an
identiﬁer, the movement records were subsequently joined with the
British Sheep and Goat Inventory to derive premises types, geo-refer-
encing data, and numbers of animals held at each premises. Cattle
movements are registered at the individual animal level and are re-
ported both by the farmer at the holding of origin and the farmer at the
holding of destination. After removing births and movements with
identical destination and departure location, movement records were
joined with location data to retrieve premises types. Movements that
could be clearly attributed as being exempt from standstill regulations
were excluded from the data.2 Cattle production types were categorised
as described in Gates and Woolhouse (2015), whereas only a single
category was used for sheep. Finally, the individual movement records
were batched in order to calculate holding level standstill exemptions
and combined with the batched sheep movements. Standstill periods
were calculated as follows: for each unique destination premises we
retrieved all subsequent movements leaving this particular holding and
calculated the waiting time with respect to the earlier on-movement.
Each movement falling into the standstill period (less than 13 days) but
for which no exemptions were explicitly identiﬁed, were marked as
movements breaking the standstill regulations.
2.2. Availability of data and materials
Due to the sensitive nature of the data used in this work, we are
unable to make the data publically available. The data on sheep
movements records retrieved from the Scottish Animal Movement
System and the Agricultural Census are held by the Scottish
Government, whereas the data on cattle movement records are held by
the British Cattle Movement Service. All data are subject to data sharing
agreements.
2.3. Network generation
We used recorded livestock movements to generate rewired contact
networks by re-directing movements to markets (which could poten-
tially carry higher risk), based on changes in farmer activity that are
economically sensible and that could be theoretically implemented by
adjusting the existing legislation. To investigate legislative changes in
movement restrictions and market trade patterns, a 4-week period (with
an additional 2-week burn-in period) of recorded livestock movements
was determined as suﬃcient. Rewiring was conducted under the as-
sumption that individual movements will be conserved in number,
volume, and as closely as possible in time. For example, if a farmer was
not allowed to move a batch of livestock within Scotland on a given
day, then he or she are assumed to move that same number of livestock
in a single batch at the next acceptable opportunity. We generated 8
sets of movement networks based on a 4-week period of recorded sheep
and cattle movements (October 2010) through the combinations of
standstill length (6 or 13 days), standstill exemption (yes or no), and
market-rewire (yes or no)). An adaptive algorithm was created to re-
wire the combined sheep and cattle livestock movement network by
pushing movements violating a chosen standstill forward to the next
legal date as closely as possible in time and by maintaining number and
volume of the individual movements. The process was dynamic, with
movements diverted to the next permissible date past the expiration of
the standstill, and triggering a new standstill at the destination pre-
mises. Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of each scenario. To
account for existing standstill exemptions, exempt movements were
identiﬁed and removed during rewiring before applying structural
changes to the livestock movement network. These movements were
reinserted at the ﬁnal stage of rewiring. Disallowed farm-to-market
movements were pushed back to the next available market day of the
same production type at the same market after the end of the movement
restriction period, whereas farm-to-farm movements were delayed to
the next legal day. Market movements for particular production types
occur only on a limited number of dates during the calendar year,
which can result in diverted movements occurring weeks or months
after the recorded movement taking place. In order to account for this,
movements were shifted to the market with nearest geographical
proximity on the next available market day of the originally recorded
production type, considering all markets in Scotland. Nearest markets
2 We aimed to identify “true” standstill violations by separating out movements asso-
ciated with known exemptions and therefore allowed to move animals within the nominal
(footnote continued)
standstill period. Supplementary material A.2. summarises how standstill exemptions
were treated for cattle and sheep movements in detail.
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were identiﬁed as follows: based on the geo-location data of the re-
corded market, a list of markets was generated in increasing order of
distance from each of Scotland's 891 agricultural parishes. This could
then be applied to market movements during the rewiring process.
2.4. Network measures
Network measures (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) can be used to
gain information about the dynamics of disease spread through ana-
lysing the network contact structure (Dubé et al., 2011a; Kao et al.,
2006; Kiss et al., 2006). In this section, we give a brief overview of the
network measures that we used to investigate the livestock movement
networks and on which we conducted FMD outbreak simulations. All of
the monthly networks were analysed by including the direction of the
links, i.e. as directed networks.3 On the whole, the rewiring process
leads to diﬀerent contact structures that can be represented by net-
works and examined with network measurements. While the network is
dynamic, static network measures have been shown to provide useful
information on the relative risks associated with the GB livestock net-
work (e.g. Kao et al., 2007). The static network measures applied here
can be broken down into network-level measures (global network
measure) and node-level measures. There are many node-level mea-
sures that can be used to assess the importance of individual livestock
holdings in the livestock movement networks. Among those are be-
tweenness and degree, which allow for the identiﬁcation of the centrality
of individual nodes, and as a result their potential importance to disease
propagation within the livestock movement network. The betweenness
of a node represents the frequency with which a livestock holding is in
the shortest path between pairs of nodes in the network, whereas a
node’s degree represents the number of direct contacts per holding
(Freeman, 1978). Premises that have many contacts and are therefore at
the centre of activity are often referred to as hubs. In terms of disease
spread, identifying both high-degree and high-betweenness nodes can
be useful as high-degree nodes are likely to become infected early on in
an epidemic and high-betweenness nodes are likely to accelerate the
spread of infection through the network. Similarly, targeting these key
actors for rapid disease control can be extremely eﬀective (Keeling
et al., 2011). In a directed network where we consider the direction of
trade, both the number of incoming connections (in-degree) and the
number of outgoing connections (out-degree) can be considered
(Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Global network measures on the other
hand can be used to assess how connected the network is as a whole.
Besides the node-level centrality measures described above, six net-
work-level measurements (density, degree assortativity, average path
length, diameter, density, connected components (strongly / weakly
connected components)) were calculated for each monthly network
using R (version 3.2.1) (R Developement Core Team, 2015) and the R
package igraph (Csárdi and Nepusz, 2006).
The density of a network indicates how connected the nodes are and
is deﬁned as the proportion of links among livestock operations in the
network that are currently observed (see Dubé et al., 2009; Wasserman
and Faust, 1994). A value of one implies that all potential connections
are realized. The diameter of the network is the largest shortest path in
the network. The bigger the diameter of a network, the less connected a
network tends to be. For livestock movement networks, degree assor-
tativity describes the tendency of a holding to be preferably connected
to holdings which have degrees similar to their own (degree assorta-
tivity close to 1). In networks with disassortative mixing, high-degree
holdings tend to be connected to holdings with a low degree and vice
versa (degree assortativity close to −1) (Newman, 2010). Generally
speaking, the maximal outbreak size of an epidemic is driven by the
component structure of the network where components represent sub-
groups of nodes in which all pairs of nodes (i.e. livestock holdings and
markets) are directly or indirectly connected. Networks are not ne-
cessarily connected and not every node is reachable from all others,
however many real-world networks exhibit a giant component that
contains the majority of nodes in the network. How connected a net-
work is typically determines how fast and far a disease can spread.
Connected components can be described as subnetworks within a net-
work and can be divided into strong connected components and weak
connected components. In essence, weakly connected components re-
present subnetworks for which a path exists between any pair of nodes,
irrespective of the link direction. Likewise, strongly connected com-
ponents are subnetworks where each network node can be reached
from every other node in the network through either one or multiple
directed paths. Importantly, if a disease enters a holding within a
strongly connected component it can potentially reach any other
holding within that strong connected component. It has been suggested
that identifying strong components of a network is vital in estimating
the population at risk of infection because introduction of disease into a
node within the strong component puts all other nodes within that
component at risk (Kao et al., 2006; Kiss et al., 2006). In animal
movement networks, the calculation of a giant strongly connected
component (GSCC) size may then be used to estimate potential epi-
demic sizes. In a livestock movement network the average path length
represents the shortest path among two livestock holdings averaged
over all existing pairs of holdings in the network (Dubé et al., 2011a,b,
2009). The clustering coeﬃcient measures the degree of interconnection
which may exist between neighbours of a node of interest (Watts and
Strogatz, 1998), where a high degree of clustering can reduce the size of
an epidemic (Kiss et al., 2006).
2.5. FMD simulation model
We developed a spatial stochastic model of FMD transmission and
control (adapted from Green et al. (2006)) to investigate the impact of
Table 1
Summary of rewiring scenarios. The total number of scenarios included each combination of possibilities (8 in total). The network name denotes the length of the
standstill (e.g. 13 days), followed by information on whether the network was rewired to the nearest market (Rw+) or not (Rw-), and lastly whether standstill
exemptions were allowed (Ex+), or prohibited (Ex-).
Name Proportion of movements occurring on a diﬀerent
date from recorded
Number of movements Proportion of departure farms aﬀected by a
diverted movement
Number of departure
farms
6 days Rw- Ex- 0.185 51295 0.21 10487
6 days Rw- Ex+ 0.059 52574 0.10 10554
6 days Rw+ Ex- 0.208 52353 0.23 10523
6 days Rw+ Ex+ 0.067 52947 0.11 10564
13 days Rw- Ex- 0.247 45218 0.25 9930
13 days Rw- Ex+ 0.083 50488 0.14 10474
13 days Rw+ Ex- 0.286 46937 0.27 9994
13 days Rw+ Ex+ 0.096 51138 0.15 10496
3 Note that we use the terms nodes and links when we refer to networks generally, but
use the terms holdings / premises and movements when discussing implications speciﬁc
for the contacts considered in the study.
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changed standstill regulations and of structural changes to the livestock
movement network through a combinations of:
(i) two diﬀerent movement restriction regimes (by applying either a
13-day standstill or 6-day standstills after livestock are moved onto
an agricultural holding),
(ii) two diﬀerent rewiring regimes (re-directing movements to the
nearest market of the same production type or not),
(iii) two diﬀerent exemption regimes (either exemptions to the stand-
still regulations were allowed or there were no exemptions).
The simulation framework combined dissemination of FMD through
direct farm-to-farm movements, via movements through markets, and
via local spread, along with control measures that included examina-
tion of dangerous contacts and culling of animals on conﬁrmed pre-
mises. The model was individual-based at the level of the holding, and
generated infection stochastically while replaying recorded livestock
movements. Livestock movements and events of local spread occur on
speciﬁc dates and based on these timings, each farm could be classiﬁed
into one of ﬁve compartmental states:
(i) S – these are holdings with susceptible animals only.
(ii) H – these are restricted farms, i.e. farms that have exposed animals
on them, but these animals are subject to isolation until the end of
the movement restriction period (prompted by the movement of
animals onto the farm). Here, the length of the movement re-
striction period is dependent on the chosen standstill scenario,
taking on either 6 days or 13 days. There is not yet risk for
transmission to other farms, neither by movements nor by local
spread.
(iii) E – farms that can infect other farms by moving exposed animals
only, not by local spread. A latent (incubation) period of ﬁve days
was used.
(iv) I – farms with infectious animals (after the incubation period).
These farms are a possible source of infection (either by oﬀ-
movement or local spread).
(v) R – farms that are either culled or under control, thus do not cause
a risk of further infection.
To allow for the dissemination of the pathogen, the infection was
seeded at ﬁve farms that are known to have moved sheep onwards
within three days after the start of the simulation. Seed cases were put
into the I (infectious) compartment, and the disease was allowed to
spread unrestrictedly for 20 days, which is broadly similar to the period
for which FMD remained undetected in Scotland at the beginning of the
2001 UK outbreak (Gibbens et al., 2001). After this a national move-
ment ban is imposed so that infections can only spread locally. As
markets do not permanently keep livestock, they become disinfected
and re-enter the S state at the end of the day after any oﬀ-movement.
The simulation ﬁnished when there were no infected (E, H, or I) farms
in the population.
2.5.1. Infection through animal movements
Disease spread through direct farm-to-farm movements was im-
plemented as outlined in Green et al. (2006), where the probability of
farm infection through a movement of batched animals of size b with at
least one infected animal was set to 1−(1−μ)b, with each animal in-
fected with probability μ set to 0.02.
To calculate the probability of a farm to become infected by a
transitional on-movement of livestock, i.e. livestock that was sold
through a market, several adaptions where made to the Green et al.
(2006) model - the main diﬀerence being that the model makes use of
the knowledge whether movements originated from an infected pre-
mise (IP): (i) It was assumed that farms in the H compartment (i.e.
farms with dedicated isolation facilities) could not get infected locally
as the farm had been infected through livestock movements and hence
will already host infectious animals (local infection will take longer to
develop). These farms were not yet infectious by local spread (due to
the on-farm restrictions) but could infect other farms locally after the
incubation period had passed (an incubation period of 5 days was
used). (ii) Where information about the source farm of moved livestock
was unavailable, the probability that a batch of livestock containing at
least one infected animal which can transmit an infection onto a farm
was set to ptrans=1−(1−μ)b (μ is assumed to be the same for batched
livestock sold on the same day). (iii) Whenever the movement recording
system allowed the identiﬁcation and tracking of batched livestock, the
probability of transmission was corrected to account for a higher in-
fection probability for livestock originating from an infected farm than
for livestock originating from a susceptible farm. This was implemented
by adjusting the new probability of transmission to ptrans=1 − (1 −
μF)i (1 − μ′)s, where i is the number of animals moved from infected
farms, s is the number of animals moved from susceptible farms, μF is
the probability of infection through a known movement from an in-
fected farm for one animal (which is higher than μ), and μ′ is the
probability of infection from susceptible farms. Hence, the increase of
infection probability of livestock sold from an IP was counterbalanced
by a decreased probability of infection from susceptible farms (μ′),
which relates to a baseline risk of infection due to contact with in-
fectious animals from other batches at the market. To ensure con-
sistency with the earlier model, μF was set to 0.02, μ was chosen to be
the same as for oﬀ-market movements (0.004), and μ′ was ﬁtted so that
the overall force of infection via markets for each market was the same
as estimated in Green et al. (2006) (i.e. the average number of infected
premises generated by one market through transitional passage of
sheep which originated from an IP).
2.5.2. Infection through local spread
Infection through local spread was modelled using the same con-
stant rate of generation of new cases as applied in Green et al. (2006),
with a β-value of 0.065 per day on the infectious holding. This β-value
has been proven to reproduce similar epidemic peak numbers (both for
local spread and spread through movements) as observed in the 2001
FMD epidemic in the UK (Gibbens et al. 2001). On each simulation day,
a number of infectious contacts were sampled from a Poisson dis-
tribution without replacement, independently for each infectious farm.
Only farms that were known to keep livestock (as retrieved from the
agricultural census) were considered for this. Infectious contacts were
then chosen from all susceptible farms using a radius of 10 km and
weighted in proportion to the distance d by p ∼ e−ad, where a was
speciﬁed as a=0.5 km−1.
2.5.3. Control strategies (C)
Control programmes are often complicated and can range from pre-
emptive culling to vaccination of ‘at risk’ animals. In this framework,
we simulated control measures using two mechanisms: (i) detection of
infectious premises after a certain number of days with clinical signs
and (ii) contact tracing of on- and oﬀ-movements to target serological
examinations at farms that could have received infected animals. The
model assumes that after 7 days of clinical signs a farm would be re-
ported to be infectious by the owner, which then would lead to diag-
nosis and removal (i.e. culled or put under restrictions that will allow
for no further spread of infection). Contact tracing was implemented
iteratively, starting with the ﬁrst conﬁrmed case. Once a farm was
conﬁrmed to be an IP, all animals kept on the farm would be culled
within 24 h. Subsequently dangerous contacts (DC) have to be identi-
ﬁed and farms that are at risk of infection need to be examined. It was
assumed that there would be no pre-emptive culling, only diagnosed
farms would be removed. Conﬁrmed IPs were transferred to the (R)
compartment and could not infect other farms. To obtain farms that
traded livestock with an IP, the contact tracing window was set to 21
days, which is in agreement with current policies in the UK. During the
simulations we obtained all on- and oﬀ-movements for the IP that
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occurred within 21 days preceding the identiﬁcation and: (i) direct
contacts were transferred to the investigation queue and examined after
1 day (to simulate latency in contact tracing) (ii) for movements
through markets, dangerous markets (i.e. those receiving or sending
animals to or from the IP) were identiﬁed and all recipients of animals
on those days were transferred to the investigation queue and examined
after 4 days. Contact tracing procedures were performed iteratively,
starting with farms that were diagnosed by clinical signs ﬁrst. Once the
examined farm was conﬁrmed to be infectious, it acquired IP-status and
the same procedures were performed for its contacts. For farms that
were not infectious, no further contact tracing was triggered. The
transition diagram of the compartmental model including control
measures is visually summarised in Fig. 1.
2.5.4. Epidemic simulations
Simulations were set to start at 20 randomly selected dates
throughout the speciﬁed month and this process was replicated at the
beginning of each simulation to introduce additional stochastic varia-
tion (the parameters used in the model are summarised in
Supplementary Material, Table A.3). A total of 1000 simulations were
performed for the recorded movement network and the alternate re-
wired networks. We quantiﬁed distributions of epidemic size using the
Harrell–Davis estimate of the deciles (Wilcox, 2012). The 95% per-
centile bootstrap conﬁdence intervals were computed from 1000 sam-
ples. To quantify diﬀerences between deciles of epidemic size dis-
tributions, we used the shift function, which is a robust statistical tool
that allows to compare whole distributions by assessing if and to which
extent two distributions diﬀer (Doksum, 1977; Rousselet et al., 2017;
Wilcox, 2006, 1995).
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive summary of standstill compliance
As a ﬁrst step, we reviewed three years (2011–2013) of recorded
sheep and cattle movements in Scotland under the existing standstill
rules of 13 days regarding how these regulations have inﬂuenced
farmer behaviour, and in particular their level of compliance with
them. For 19,924 unique sheep holdings in Scotland (including mar-
kets) we retrieved 193,792 batched movements and calculated their
Fig. 1. The transition diagram of the model. Susceptible farms (S)
can get infected via local spread (E) or infected animal movements
(H), and then become infectious (I) after a certain period of time.
Susceptible or infected farms can be removed (culled or taken
under control) by moving through the (C) compartment to (R).
Farms with clinical signs in animals (I) can be detected during
examination or contact tracing. Farms that were conﬁrmed to be
infected are placed into the conﬁrmed compartment (C) and will
then be moved to the removed compartment (R) within a short
period of time. Only farms from (I) and (H) (after having passed
the incubation period) can infect others.
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corresponding standstills periods. There were 39,686 movements from
4584 unique sheep holdings in total that fell into the 13-day standstill
period. A total of 18,925 movements within the 13-day standstill period
are exempt and allowed to move animals within that period (47% of
movements within the standstill period). There were 20,761 that were
identiﬁed as movements potentially breaching standstill regulations
(10% of the total number of movements). For the cattle movements, we
counted in total of 20,990 movements from 9723 unique cattle holdings
in Scotland that fall into the standstill period. Of these, 10,026 move-
ments occurred within 13 days and are considered exempt (47% of
movements within the standstill period) while 10,964 movements
violated the standstill rule.
Fig. 2 shows the number of combined cattle and sheep movements
after excluding identiﬁable exemptions. The number of movements
were aggregated by waiting time and plotted for the standstill period of
13 days after a movement ban had been taken eﬀect. The red line in-
dicates the proportion of movements that appear exempt (as reﬂected
by the percentage scale on the right). As can be seen from Fig. 2, most
animals are moved on day 1 after the movement ban had been imposed.
As on-movements of one species can impose a standstill on another
species, it is important to identify mixed species holdings. This was
done by matching the list of actively trading sheep holdings against
cattle holdings for the study period in question, with 77% of cattle
holdings (7488 of 9723) recording movements found to be also actively
trading sheep. There are twice as many mixed holdings with authorised
separation agreements4 than single species holdings (see Tables 2 and
3).
Nevertheless, single species holdings are more likely than mixed
species holdings to have a recorded agreement (Relative risk= 1.26;
95% CI: 1.24,1.29). Mixed holdings appear to predominantly rear beef
(see Table 3). Comparing exempt versus non-exempt movements ac-
cording to their destination type (animal holdings, landless keepers, or markets), there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the destination
location type for movements within 13 days). For cattle, non-exempt
movements are more often to market than exempt movements, al-
though the diﬀerence is small (see Table 4).
3.2. Network analysis
The networks were aggregated on a monthly scale, analysed sepa-
rately and then compared. The contact distribution for the ‘baseline’
Fig. 2. Frequency of combined sheep and cattle movements
(2011–2013) during the standstill period, aggregated by waiting
time after standstill regulations take eﬀect. The red line indicates
the proportion of movements that appear exempt (as reﬂected by
the percentage scale on the right) (For interpretation of the re-
ferences to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article).
Table 2
Comparison of cattle only holdings to mixed holdings (sheep & cattle) with
authorised separation agreements (top row) and without agreement (bottom
row).
Cattle Only Cattle & Sheep
Agreement 2083 5674
No Agreement 152 1814
Table 3
Count of herd types for mixed holdings (sheep and cattle) compared to count of
herd types for cattle-only holdings.
Beef Dairy Mixed Other
Cattle only 2134 339 19 9
Cattle & Sheep 7749 1249 69 22
Table 4
Number of movements within the 13-day standstill period, separated by species
type and grouped by location type. For each species, the top row denotes
movement that are exempt, the bottom row denotes standstill violations. There
is no signiﬁcant diﬀerent between exempt and non-exempt movements ac-
cording to destination type.
Species Status Animal Holdings Landless Keepers Markets
Cattle Exempt 4173 129 5724
Not Exempt 3967 136 6861
Sheep Exempt 18889 14 22
Not Exempt 20624 23 114
4 Holdings with separation facilities, where livestock brought onto a farm can be kept
away from other livestock within the business while movement restrictions are in place,
can apply for a livestock separation agreement to be put in place with the Rural Payments
and Inspections Division’s (RPID). With the RPID’s approval, these businesses can avoid a
13-day standstill across the entire holding, given that animals brought onto the holding
are kept separate from other animals on the farm, and the 13-day standstill will apply
only to the livestock that was brought on, and not to other animals on the farm.
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network (the originally recorded cattle and sheep movement networks)
exhibits a highly right skewed pattern where a small number of in-
dividuals (“hubs”) make a disproportionately large number of contacts.
These hubs establish many outgoing links and are inﬂuential on how far
and fast a disease can spread within the population (Keeling and Eames,
2005; Kiss et al., 2006; Volkova et al., 2010). The rewiring technique
applied in this analysis does not have a meaningful eﬀect on the overall
contact distribution5 (Fig. 3A). However, as movements to markets are
re-routed, the ingoing contact structure of markets is aﬀected (Fig. 3B).
This is related to the fact that most movements violating movement
restrictions are movements between animal holdings, not transitional
movements via markets (∼74% of non-exempt movements are direct
farm-to-farm movements). Hence, this did not lead to a systematic in-
crease of the median indegree.
Livestock contact networks have been shown to exhibit small-world
properties such as the local clustering of contacts with the occasional
long-distance jumps that allows for spreading disease to more distant
network communities (e.g Kao et al., 2006; Watts and Strogatz, 1998).
Table 5 summarises the global graph properties for each of the rewired
scenarios and the observed livestock movement network separately. As
can be seen in Table 5 the degree assortativity coeﬃcients (or Pearson
correlation coeﬃcients (r)) of all networks exhibit disassortative mixing
(r< 0). This implies that dissimilar nodes tend to connect to each other
and hubs are unlikely to connect to other hubs (Kao et al., 2006). The
originally recorded network exhibits small-world properties, which is
reﬂected in short average path length compared to a random network of
similar size. Rewiring signiﬁcantly increases both the average path
length and diameter for all rewired scenarios compared to the recorded
livestock movement network. This has important implications for FMD
transmission dynamics in the pre-movement ban phase: potential dis-
ease pathways are reduced and distant communities therefore less
likely to be aﬀected (Gibbens et al., 2001; Keeling et al., 2001). As
illustrated in Table 5, the size of the GSCC (36% of the overall network)
and GWCC (100%) of the recorded movement network are reduced
through re-routing the existing links. The diameter of each rewired
network increases substantially because rewiring leads to one isolated
component within the GSCC. All artiﬁcially generated networks re-
sulted in networks with higher clustering coeﬃcients, and lower den-
sity for the artiﬁcially generated networks compared to the recorded
movement network.
In Table 6, we report measures that are indicators of network con-
nectivity (“centrality measures”) for the giant strong connected com-
ponent for each rewired network grouped by premises type (animal
holdings (AH) or markets (MA)). Unsurprisingly, markets are hubs in
the livestock movement network as reﬂected in the large number of
connections they make (the degree) and the amount of control that these
market nodes exert over the interactions of other nodes in the livestock
movement network (i.e. their betweenness). The overall degree does not
meaningfully change between the rewired scenarios compared to the
originally recorded movements. For markets, their average between-
ness increases through any chosen manner of rewiring. However, the
number of incoming connections (indegree) of markets does not sys-
tematically increase as this is depended on (i) the presence of standstill
exemption (i.e. animals moved from any of the Scottish Island areas to
markets on the mainland are currently exempt) and that (ii) non-ex-
empt movements which are pushed forward are mostly movements
between animal holdings (∼74% of non-exempt movements).
3.3. Epidemic size
All rewiring scenarios lead to a decrease in ﬁnal epidemic size
compared to the simulated FMD outbreak on the recorded movements
(see Table 7).
The presence of standstill exemptions irrespective of the length of
the standstill period on average increases the probability of a larger
epidemic. A simulated FMD epidemic in these scenarios result in larger
number of infections than the FMD simulation where absent and epi-
demic size tended to be smaller.
Given that we were interested in assessing the risk and beneﬁts of a
potential change in movement standstill policy towards a shorter
standstill period of 6-days, in further analyses we focus on only four
FMD simulation scenarios: (i) the “extreme” scenario with a 13-day
standstill and no allowed exemptions (“13 days Rw- Ex-”), which
should reﬂect the “best” simulation outcome compared to the FMD si-
mulation on the empirical observed movements in terms of a reduction
in total number of infections, (ii) a scenario which mimics the England-
Wales standstills approach, i.e. a 6-day standstill with a much reduced
number of exemptions (“6 days Rw+ Ex-”), (iii) and the FMD simula-
tion output on the recorded movements (“Recorded”) as a baseline to
which we compare the rewired scenarios to. While the ‘best’ scenario is
highly unlikely to be implemented by the livestock industry as it is
associated with signiﬁcant economic cost, the 6-day-, no-exemption-
scenario is similar to the one implemented by England and Wales, and
may oﬀer a feasible alternative to the current regulations in Scotland.
Visually inspecting the distributions of epidemic size in Fig. 4 sug-
gests that both rewired scenarios signiﬁcantly diﬀer from the simulated
outbreak on the recorded movements, with the FMD simulations on the
recorded movement scenario more likely to result in much larger out-
break numbers. A bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (1000 sam-
ples) conﬁrms signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001) smaller outbreaks on the re-
wired networks. Interestingly, despite being substantially more
Fig. 3. A. Long-tailed degree distribution for
the recorded movement network on original
scale. B. The distribution of in-degrees of
markets only in the cattle / sheep network
considering all nine scenarios, plotted on a log-
scale. Names for each scenario were chosen so
that the number at the beginning of each name
represent the length of the standstill period
applied to the respective scenario, followed by
whether it had been rewired to the nearest
market or not as indicated by binary categories
(Rw+ / Rw-), and ﬁnally whether standstill
exemptions were allowed or not (Ex+ / Ex-).
5 Note that we used network measures as a tool to compare model output diﬀerences
and our results should not be interpreted as denoting real contact networks.
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restrictive, the extreme scenario where no standstill exemptions exist
does not provide substantially greater protection compared to the
‘England-Wales’ scenario.
To assess in what respect the ‘England-Wales’ scenario diﬀers from
the ‘extreme’ scenario, we used the shift function (Rousselet et al.,
2017), As Fig. 5 illustrates, the two rewired scenarios only diﬀer in the
right tail, which is captured by signiﬁcant diﬀerences for deciles 6 to 9
(Fig. 5.B).
3.4. FMD model simulations: spatial eﬀects
In order to determine if the impact of legislation changes varied
regionally, we generated spatial maps of the FMD model output for
each rewired scenario and compared them to the spatial maps for FMD
simulation outputs on the originally recorded movements. The number
of infections per 10 km2 grid square were counted and averaged over
1000 simulation runs, and compared at each grid square to the outputs
of each rewired scenario. Fig. 6 (left) shows the number of infections
per 10 km2 grid square for the FMD simulation on the recorded
movements. As expected, both rewired scenarios result in a smaller
number of infections per 10 km2 grid square than compared to a si-
mulated FMD outbreak on the recorded movements, with similar geo-
graphical distributions of reductions (though with the 13-days Rw- Ex-
scenarios showing broader beneﬁt).
4. Discussion
Scrutinising potential legislative changes for the trade network in
Scotland requires that we not only take into account how this aﬀects
individual decision-making but also how this might alter the emergent
properties of the network structure itself. In this paper, we investigated
how changing the local contact structure simultaneously through
Table 5
Summary of global graph properties for the rewired network and the observed network (bottom). The network name denotes the length of the standstill (e.g. 13
days), followed by information on whether the network was rewired to the nearest market (Rw+) or not (Rw-), and lastly whether standstill exemptions were
allowed (Ex+), or prohibited (Ex-).
Network Size (No. of nodes) Edge
count
Avg.path.
length
Dia-meter Density Clust.
Coeﬃcient
Assortativity GSCC GWCC
Recorded (13days standstill 14,608 76,691 2.9 7 5× 10−4 6× 10−3 −0.118 5,290
(36%)
14,608
(100%)
13 days Rw- Ex- 14,396 59,508 4.3 12 3×10−4 1.4× 10−2 −0.160 3,449
(23%)
13,833
(96%)
13 days Rw- Ex+ 14,526 65,240 4.1 12 3×10−4 1.5× 10−2 −0.153 4,291
(29%)
13,997
(96%)
13 days Rw+ Ex- 14,432 65,241 3.8 11 3×10−4 1.3× 10−2 −0.180 3,611
(25%)
13,876
(96%)
13 days Rw+ Ex+ 14,546 67,712 3.9 11 3×10−4 1.5× 10−2 −0.161 4,355
(29%)
14,020
(96%)
6 days Rw- Ex- 14,655 66,032 4.1 12 3×10−4 1.5× 10−2 −0.156 4,380
(29%)
14,129
(97%)
6 days Rw- Ex+ 14,612 67,242 4.1 12 3×10−4 1.6× 10−2 −0.154 4,539
(31%)
14,088
(96%)
6 days Rw+ Ex- 14,651 70,600 3.8 11 3×10−4 1.5× 10−2 −0.169 4,446
(30%)
14,122
(96%)
6 days Rw+ Ex+ 14,625 68,997 3.9 12 3×10−4 1.6 10−2 −0.159 4,561
(31%)
14,103
(96%)
Table 6
Network summary statistics for recorded and rewired network reporting indegree, outdegree, degree, and normalised betweenness grouped by type (Markets (MA)
vs. Animal Holdings (AH)). The network name denotes the length of the standstill (e.g. 13 days), followed by information on whether the network was rewired to the
nearest market (Rw+) or not (Rw-), and lastly whether standstill exemptions were allowed (Ex+), or prohibited (Ex-).
Network Type Degree
median
In-degree
median
Out-degree
median
Betweenness
median
Out-degree
min
Degree
max.
In-degree
max.
Out-degree
max.
Betweenness max.
Recorded AH 7 3 3 1.25E-05 1 655 652 103 0.015
MA 244 112 106 0.01 5 1796 768 1028 0.129
13 days Rw- Ex- AH 5 2 2 6.28E-05 1 52 21 49 0.026
MA 217 89 89 0.04 1 1189 525 664 0.346
13 days Rw- Ex
+
AH 6 3 3 4.91E-05 1 290 278 94 0.048
MA 232 100 95 0.03 1 1648 699 949 0.341
13 days Rw+
Ex-
AH 5 2 2 8.56E-05 1 80 25 74 0.012
MA 191 87.5 92 0.03 1 1440 645 795 0.308
13 days Rw+ Ex
+
AH 6 3 3 5.41E-05 1 291 279 95 0.033
MA 247 110 104 0.02 3 1778 773 1005 0.352
6 days Rw- Ex- AH 6 3 2 5.59E-05 1 80 66 74 0.023
MA 240 100 107 0.027 1 1634 696 938 0.343
6 days Rw- Ex+ AH 6 3 3 4.60E-05 1 294 282 98 0.044
MA 238 104 91 0.025 3 1693 718 975 0.333
6 days Rw+ Ex- AH 6 3 2 6.21E-05 1 127 73 94 0.009
MA 298 108 153 0.02 3 1940 813 1127 0.325
6 days Rw+ Ex
+
AH 7 3 3 4.90E-05 1 294 282 98 0.035
MA 254 105 103 0.02 2 1798 790 1008 0.327
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movement restrictions and rewired connections between holdings and
markets might aﬀect the ﬁnal size of a simulated FMD outbreak. From
an epidemiological perspective, there is obvious beneﬁt from rewiring,
resulting in networks with higher clustering coeﬃcients. As noted
above, disease transmission through networks with higher clustering
coeﬃcients will show a more rapid reduction of susceptibles (Keeling
and Eames, 2005). Hence, if a holding transmits a disease to its two
connected neighbours, the number of susceptibles not only decreases
for the holding in question, but also for its neighbours. The higher
clustering coeﬃcient also leads to lower density for the artiﬁcially
generated networks compared to the recorded movement network,
which in turn also decreases the number of susceptible contacts.
Overall, the static network measures appear to be good predictors for
the outcome of the simulations, resulting in smaller epidemics on all
rewired scenarios.
Investigating the epidemic size for the FMD simulation on the re-
wired networks compared to the FMD simulation output of the em-
pirically observed network clearly shows that the presence of standstill
exemptions will increase the probability of resulting in a larger epi-
demic size. This eﬀect is independent of the length of the standstill
period and also extends to the spatial eﬀects, where we observe a re-
liable reduction in the number of infections per 10 km2 grid square for
each rewired model run. Importantly, a shorter movement standstill
without exemptions is almost as eﬀective as the extreme scenario using
a long standstill of 13 days, given that any movement standstill ex-
emptions are prohibited. Nevertheless, a reduction in the length of the
standstill period from thirteen days to six days in combination with
additional standstill exemptions can result in more rapidly rising dis-
ease incidence. Although the simulations presented here do not claim to
be completely realistic — a national movement ban would be triggered
as soon as a case of FMD is identiﬁed on a holding rather than after a
ﬁxed period of time—the number of infected holdings can be used as an
indicator for the relative impact of legislation changes on the spread of
FMD.
Redirecting movements to a diﬀerent market of the same production
type did not seem to aﬀect the epidemic dynamics. However, we did not
explicitly consider redirecting links based on the node degree of the
markets. Potentially, a ﬁner grained algorithm which aims at mini-
mising the formation of high-risk edges between source premises with a
high in-degree and destination premises with a high out-degree as well
as the integration of behavioral patterns is necessary. Speciﬁcally, re-
directing market movements from high-volume markets to markets
with less ingoing connections may result in a diﬀerent simulation
outcome. Likewise, holdings with diﬀerent production types will likely
have diﬀerent contact patterns and the rewiring model could be ex-
panded to include holding speciﬁc data.
While the number of premises that appear to be violating legally
binding standstill requirements could be high, numerous deﬁciencies
and inconsistencies in the available data prevent the full scope of
movements during the standstill period from being appropriately ca-
tegorised. The greater detail of the CTS database resulted in a greater
ability to identify standstill exemptions in cattle. Given that many
standstill exemptions refer to individual animal characteristics, we were
not able to accurately identify these exemptions for the batched sheep
data. However, even in cattle - where we were able to identify almost
twice as many apparent standstill exemptions than in sheep - there are
Table 7
Descriptive summary statistics of FMD simulation output for epidemic size
based on number of infections for recorded movements (top row) and rewired
movement networks. The network name denotes the length of the standstill
(e.g. 13 days), followed by information on whether the network was rewired to
the nearest market (Rw+) or not (Rw-), and lastly whether standstill exemp-
tions were allowed (Ex+), or prohibited (Ex-).
Network Min. 1 st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Recorded 1 55 97 113.6 153 374
13 days Rw- Ex- 1 9 17.5 23.18 30 128
13 days Rw- Ex+ 1 40 72 76.41 107 325
13 days Rw+ Ex- 1 8 19 26.56 40 120
13 days Rw+ Ex+ 1 16 49 62.57 88 284
6 days Rw- Ex- 1 16 34 38.53 57 132
6 days Rw- Ex+ 1 23 54.5 70.73 103.8 267
6 days Rw+ Ex- 1 7 20 29.61 44 152
6 days Rw+ Ex+ 1 40 62 69.43 94 219
Fig. 4. Kernel density estimates for the output of the FMD simulation on recorded movements (top), the rewired ‘extreme’ scenario of 13 days standstill with no
exemptions (middle), and the rewired ‘England-Wales’ scenario of 6-day standstill with no exemptions (bottom), with vertical lines representing deciles.
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still more movements taking place within the ﬁrst six days of the
standstill period that possibly violate mandatory movement restrictions
than those which are obviously exempt. This is potentially due to the
fact that market days occur every seven days. It is also likely that these
movements include many movements that are in fact exempt from the
standstill rule, for example due to linked cattle holdings (Enright and
Kao, 2016). Some movements violating the standstill restrictions may
also result from confusion over the rules (Hunting, 2006), and it may be
beneﬁcial to take investigations into farmer behaviour and their per-
ception of the standstill regime into consideration.
5. Conclusions
Our results suggest that explicitly manipulating the contact network
structure in a sensible way has the potential to signiﬁcantly impact
disease control. However, any legislation impacting livestock move-
ment patterns could also have undesirable eﬀects such as forcing small
markets out of business or even increasing the likelihood of a larger
outbreak. Whatever the underlying reasons for violating movement
standstills, the large number of movements in an apparent restriction
period indicate that a simpler biosecurity system with shorter standstills
but no exemptions, which would likely be easier to legislate for and
Fig. 5. A. Kernel density estimates for the output of the FMD si-
mulation on the rewired ‘extreme’ scenario of 13 days standstill
with no exemptions (top), and the rewired ‘England-Wales’ sce-
nario of a 6-day standstill with no exemptions (bottom), with
vertical lines representing deciles. B. Shift function. The diﬀer-
ence of Group 1 (13 days, no exemptions) – group 2 (6 days, no
exemptions) is plotted along the y-axis for each decile (white
disks), as a function of group 1 deciles. For each decile diﬀerence,
the vertical line indicates its 95% bootstrap conﬁdence interval
(1000 samples). When a conﬁdence interval does not include zero,
the diﬀerence is considered signiﬁcant.
Fig. 6. A. Number of infections per 10 km2 for
the FMD simulation on the originally recorded
cattle and sheep movements. B. Diﬀerences
between the FMD simulations on recorded
movements and the rewired ‘ideal’ scenario
(13_days Rw- Ex-, top right) and the rewired
‘England / Wales – scenario’ (6 days Rw+ Ex-,
bottom right). Warmer colours denote an in-
crease in counts, cooler colours denote a de-
crease of counts.).
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monitor, would oﬀer no substantial additional risk for FMD.
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